PROMIS Letter of Interest: Difference between revisions
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'''STREP proposal (FP7/ICT)''' |
'''STREP proposal (FP7/ICT)''' |
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'''Strategic Objective: ICT-SEC-2007.1.7: Critical Infrastructure Protection (Joint Call between ICT and Security Themes FP7-ICT-SEC-2007-1)''' |
'''Strategic Objective: ICT-SEC-2007.1.7: Critical Infrastructure Protection (Joint Call between ICT and Security Themes FP7-ICT-SEC-2007-1)'''<br/> |
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Recent worm epidemics proved beyond any doubt that the existing centralized worm containment mech- |
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anisms are no longer adequate to protect vulnerable systems, resulting in a shift towards distributed |
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cooperative systems that aim to safeguard and immunize the susceptible population by automatically |
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vaccinating them. We present PROMIS, a P2P based algorithm that provides its participants with |
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early information regarding the existence of a worm epidemic and lets them automatically adjust their |
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security level. We argue that our approach is based on the principles of hygiene: taking the basic |
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precautions to avoid infection when an epidemic is on the rise. |
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The homogeneity of most computer systems o�ers some signi�cant bene�ts, regarding portability |
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and the standardization of software development. On the other hand highly homogenous environments |
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make easy for rapid malcode to propagate in less time than any traditional reaction is possible. Probably |
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we should pay more attention to the security disadvantages of that approach and start looking for other |
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means to diminish these e�ects. |
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Fortunately, we see a more balanced choice of software and hardware in critical infrastructures. In |
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that case a system that is not vulnerable to a speci�c type of malware, can extract valuable information |
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regarding the mechanisms of the speci�c attack and pass them to rest of the systems, before these |
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systems get compromised. The systems, which participate in our proposed P2P network can thereafter, |
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apply automatically, some prede�ned countermeasures, (disabling the HTML preview in their e-mail |
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clients or increasing the security settings of their browser etc) in order to avoid the consequences of |
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a forthcoming malware epidemic. We argue that our approach is based on the principles of hygiene: |
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taking the basic precautions to avoid infection when an epidemic is on the rise. |
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==What we need from you== |
==What we need from you== |
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==Further information and communication== |
==Further information and communication== |
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Revision as of 11:38, 17 September 2007
ACRONYM PROMIS
NAME
Description
STREP proposal (FP7/ICT)
Strategic Objective: ICT-SEC-2007.1.7: Critical Infrastructure Protection (Joint Call between ICT and Security Themes FP7-ICT-SEC-2007-1)
Recent worm epidemics proved beyond any doubt that the existing centralized worm containment mech- anisms are no longer adequate to protect vulnerable systems, resulting in a shift towards distributed cooperative systems that aim to safeguard and immunize the susceptible population by automatically vaccinating them. We present PROMIS, a P2P based algorithm that provides its participants with early information regarding the existence of a worm epidemic and lets them automatically adjust their security level. We argue that our approach is based on the principles of hygiene: taking the basic precautions to avoid infection when an epidemic is on the rise.
The homogeneity of most computer systems o�ers some signi�cant bene�ts, regarding portability and the standardization of software development. On the other hand highly homogenous environments make easy for rapid malcode to propagate in less time than any traditional reaction is possible. Probably we should pay more attention to the security disadvantages of that approach and start looking for other means to diminish these e�ects.
Fortunately, we see a more balanced choice of software and hardware in critical infrastructures. In that case a system that is not vulnerable to a speci�c type of malware, can extract valuable information regarding the mechanisms of the speci�c attack and pass them to rest of the systems, before these systems get compromised. The systems, which participate in our proposed P2P network can thereafter, apply automatically, some prede�ned countermeasures, (disabling the HTML preview in their e-mail clients or increasing the security settings of their browser etc) in order to avoid the consequences of a forthcoming malware epidemic. We argue that our approach is based on the principles of hygiene: taking the basic precautions to avoid infection when an epidemic is on the rise.
